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I. Case Law  
Court Upholds Viability of Laches Defense in Estate of Price v. Hodkin. 
The sole judicial development in Utah during the last year was the 
appellate decision in Estate of Price v. Hodkin.
1
   
                                                                                                             
 * Jim Tartaglia is a Member in Steptoe & Johnson PLLC’s Denver office and 
concentrates his practice on energy transactional and title matters.  He would like to extend a 
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 1. 447 P.3d 1285 (Utah App. 2019), cert. denied 456 P.3d 388 (Utah 2019). 
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This case arose from a quiet title dispute over a one-half mineral interest 
in lands previously held by two sisters, Catherine and Virginia, as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship.  The property in question was 
owned by the sisters for over 20 years until Catherine passed away, thereby 
leaving full, fee simple title to the property in Virginia as the surviving joint 
tenant.  However, the parties acted otherwise.
2
  
Despite a lack of evidence severing the sisters’ joint tenancy, the 
administration of Catherine’s estate concluded with a court-approved deed 
from Catherine’s executor to Virginia (“1966 Deed”), purporting to convey 
Catherine’s interst in the surface of the property and reserving to her estate 
a one-half interest in the mineral estate.
3
 And, over the next 15 plus years 
following the 1966 Deed, Virginia and her successors in interest made 
several payments to Catherine’s testamentary trust to account for its share 
of oil and gas production proceeds.
4
 
Then, after the 1966 Deed had been of record for nearly 50 years, 
Virginia’s successor in interest (“Plaintiff”) sought to quiet title to the entire 
mineral estate, arguing that Virginia took full title to the property upon 
Catherine’s death, notwithstanding the 1966 Deed and the parties’ conduct 
thereafter.
5
  The trial court granted the Plaintiff’s summary judgment 
motion, rejecting, among other arguments, the defendant’s asserted 
defenses including that the Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under the 
doctrine of laches.
6
  Specifically, as to the laches defense, the district court 
found the defendant’s did not establish that Plaintiff or its predecessors in 
title “‘failed to pursue the action after becoming aware of the facts.’”
7
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment order on the 
laches defense.  As the court explained, “to prevail on a defense of laches, a 
defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff—and, in appropriate cases, the 
plaintiff’s predecessors—failed to diligently pursue its claim against the 
defendant and (2) the defendant was injured by the plaintiff’s lack of 
diligence.”
8
   
                                                                                                             
 2. See id. at 1287 (“Apparently no one at the time [of Catherine’s death] questioned 
whether Catherine’s one-half interest in the Property had already passed to Virginia, the 
surviving joint tenant, upon Catherine’s death.”)  
 3. See id. at 1287–88. 
 4. See id. at 1288. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. at 1288–89. 
 7. Id. at 1289 (citation omitted). 
 8. Id. at 1289–90 (citing cases). 
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The first prong of this standard requires proof that the plaintiff’s delay in 
bringing suit was for an unreasonable time “after knowledge of the 
breach.”
9
  In this case, the key error in the district court’s rejection of the 
laches defense rested on a simple misapplication of the plaintiff’s 
‘knowledge’: The Court of Appeals provided a thorough analysis to explain 
that knowledge in this context means actual or constructive knowledge.
10
  
In turn, the reasonableness of the delay by Plaintiff must be assessed by 
constructive knowledge of the public record.   
As opposed to the district court, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff’s 
knowledge began with the recording of the 1966 Deed, and therefore “it 
appears that [Plaintiff] failed to exercise due diligence in asserting her 
interest in the other half of the Property’s mineral rights because she and 
her predecessors unreasonably delayed by waiting 47 years to bring an 
action to quiet title.”
11
  The court also explained that this delay, which 
resulted in the defendant’s limited access to witnesses and evidence 




II. Legislative & Regulatory Developments 
A. Legislative Developments 




 effective upon Governor Herbert’s March 30, 2020 
signature, introduced further legislative direction regarding the imposition 
and collection of administrative penalties assessed by the Board of Oil, Gas 
and Mining.   
The bill’s primary impact is its substantial overhaul of Utah Code § 40-
6-11(4), which, as amended, expressly authorizes and the directs the Board 
to impose administrative penalties for violations of its rules.  These 
amendments introduce the new Utah Code § 40-6-11(4)(c)-(h), which 
provide as follows: 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 1291 (quoting Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Horne, 289 P.3d 502 (Utah 2012)). 
 10. Id. at 1291 (quoting Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Horne, 289 P.3d 502 (Utah 2012)). 
 11. Id. at 1292. 
 12. Id. at 1293–94. 
 13. S.B. 148, 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020) (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2, et 
seq. (LexisNexis 2019). 
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(c) The board shall, by rule made in accordance with Title 
63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, establish 
a standardized violation schedule to set the violations and the 
associated administrative penalty for each violation. 
(d) A single violation shall result in a single administrative 
penalty, that may be imposed on a daily basis for each day that 
the violation remains unresolved following the assessment of the 
administrative penalty or completion of the appeal. 
(e) Before initiation of an adjudicative proceeding or assessing 
an administrative penalty, and except for circumstances provided 
in Subsection (5)(b), the division shall provide a notice of 
violation to the owner and operator in the form and manner set 
forth by board rule, made in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 
3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. The rule made under 
this Subsection (4)(e) shall, at a minimum, require the notice to 
set forth the actions necessary to cure the violation and a 
reasonable period of time to cure the violation. 
(f)  Should an owner or operator fail to cure the violation as set 
out in the notice of violation under Subsection (4)(e), the 
division may initiate an adjudicative proceeding conducted in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
(g) Administrative penalties assessed by the division or the 
board may not exceed $200,000 per violation per person. 
(h) An administrative penalty assessed by the division may be 
appealed to the board within 30 days of the assessment. 
(i)  If a violation remains unabated and the maximum penalty 
amount has accrued, the division may request an emergency 
order from the board requiring the operator or person to suspend 
operations of the well or facility in violation. Operations may 
only resume upon abatement of the violation.
14
 
In addition to the above amendments, Senate Bill 148 codified collection 
procedures for these administrative penalties under the new Utah Code § 
40-6-11(8), and created the “Oil and Gas Administrative Penalties 
                                                                                                             
 14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-11(4) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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Account” under the new Utah Code § 40-6-11(9).  These statutory changes 
now provide as follows: 
(8) After an administrative penalty is assessed under this 
chapter, the division may collect that administrative penalty as if 
the administrative penalty were a judgment issued by a court of 
law so long as the penalized person was provided with notice of 
the violation, a reasonable opportunity to cure, and an 
opportunity for a hearing under Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and the administrative and 
appellate remedies are exhausted.
15
 
(9) (a) There is created within the General Fund a restricted 
account known as the "Oil and Gas Administrative Penalties 
Account." 
(b) The Oil and Gas Administrative Penalties Account shall 
consist of: (i) administrative penalties collected by the board or 
division under this chapter; and (ii) interest earned on the Oil and 
Gas Administrative Penalties Account. 
(c) The Oil and Gas Administrative Penalties Account shall 
earn interest. 
(d) Subject to appropriation by the Legislature, the division 
may use money in the Oil and Gas Administrative Penalties 
Account to offset: (i) risks to the public health, safety, or welfare 
caused by oil and gas operations for impacts and activities 
covered by bonding; or (ii) other direct impacts to the general 
public from oil and gas development as identified by the board 
and the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources at a public hearing that are not otherwise addressed 
through performance bonds allowed by Subsection 40-6-5(2)(f). 
(e) In accordance with Section 63J-1-602.1, appropriations 




Senate Bill 148 also calls for the Board to review its existing oil and gas 
bonding requirements “to determine whether the rules provide adequate 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. § 40-6-11(8) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 16. Id. § 40-6-11(9) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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B. Regulatory Updates 
There were no significant rulemaking by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas 
and Mining or other administrative actions that impact oil and gas 
development during the examination period of this survey.  However, there 
will be administrative action forthcoming with respect to the new legislative 
directions introduced by S.B. 148 above. 
 
                                                                                                             
 17. See id. § 40-6-5(9)(a) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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